The existing evidence is mixed on this question. On the one hand, some display factors seem to have the same direction of influence on both tasks, pointing to an underlying unity. For example, increasing the temporal interval between the first and second display increases both the visibility of the first display and the magnitude of the priming that occurs in identifying the second display (Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003) . Increasing the luminance contrast of the first display has a similar effect on both tasks, improving the visibility of the first display and increasing the priming effect on the second display (Brietmeyer, Öğmen, Ramon, & Chen, 2005) .
But the influences of other factors seem to dissociate the two tasks, pointing to separate neural systems responsible for the visibility of the first display and its priming effect on identifying the second display. For example, in many cases brief displays that cannot be discriminated above chance levels, and are therefore not even visible, still produce strong priming effects (Lleras & Enns, 2004; Vorberg et al, 2003) . Some reports even claim that priming is strongest when the first display is never seen (Brietmeyer et al., 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002) .
Finally, the role played by perceptual similarity of the two displays appears to have opposite effects in the two tasks, with increased display similarity generally reducing first display visibility (see Breitmeyer, 1984, for a review) while at the same time increasing the priming effect for the second display (Ellis, Young, Flude, & Hay, 1987) . However, to our knowledge the role of display similarity in the two tasks has never been compared directly in the same study.
Our first goal in this study was to examine the influence of image similarity in these two tasks, using precisely the same display conditions and the same participants in both tasks. Finding evidence that similarity plays an opposite role in the performance of these two tasks would then constitute strong evidence for a double dissociation, consistent with unique neural systems underlying these two tasks.
Our second goal was to determine whether the similarity effects in backward masking and masked priming were tied to physically defined features of the images or whether only task-relevant features participated in the similarity effects. This is an important question because the answer speaks to the levels of processing that are involved in both masking and priming. For instance, some theories propose that masking occurs at relatively early and low-levels of neural representation, prior to stages of visual processing during which the participant's goals and intentions can have an influence on perception (Keysers & Perrett, 2002; Scheerer, 1973; Turvey, 1973 ). In the priming literature, some have also proposed that primes exert their influence independent of the goals and intentions of the participants (Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980; Theeuwes, 1992 Theeuwes, , 1996 Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005) . If this is the case, for either masking or priming, then these tasks should be influenced by the physically defined similarity of the first and second display. That is, the effect of display similarity on masking and on priming should grow directly with the number and similarity of shared features in the two displays.
A REENTRANT THEORY OF PERCEPTION
In contrast to the view that masking and priming are encapsulated from the intentions of the participant, our research has focused recently on the roles played by participants' goals and their intended actions on the very earliest representations formed in the microgenesis of perception. Our ideas along these lines were first developed in studies of visual masking (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997 ), but we have since applied them to studies of masked priming (Lleras & Enns, 2004; , change blindness (Austen & Enns, 2000 , the attentional blink (Di Lollo et al, 2005; Kawahara, Enns, & Di Lollo, 2003) , the flash-lag illusion (Moore & Enns, 2004 ) and interrupted visual search (Lleras, Rensink, & Enns, 2005) . In brief, visual perception is considered to be an iterative process whereby information is analyzed at several levels, most notably a higher level associated with object representations and a lower level associated with pre-categorical sensory input.
Perceptual awareness is achieved once a "perceptual hypothesis" about a candidate object is created and confirmed by testing it against the current sensory input. Importantly, observers do not become aware of perceptual hypotheses that fail to be confirmed, http://www.ac-psych.org which can happen when sensory information regarding the initial item is no longer present in the visual system, as is the case in visual backward masking.
According to this theory, the task of reporting the identity of the first of two images in a rapid sequence of displays will be influenced by somewhat different factors than the requirement to respond as rapidly as possible to the second of two images in the sequence.
Consider first the case of a participant trying to identify the first image (i.e., a standard prime identification task). The participant must first form or activate a hypothesis about the image and then confirm that hypothesis by testing it against the available sensory evidence, before they are able to report on its identity.
If the display changes before they have had the opportunity to confirm their initial hypothesis, there will be a mismatch between the hypothesis (based on the prime) and the new sensory information (the changed image). The system will have to be reset and a new hypothesis will be initiated, based on this new image. This is the account of the reentrant theory for successful backward masking of an image. Critically, because conscious awareness of an image is required as part of the task, a perceptual match must be established and this requires not only a feed-forward sweep of processing but also at least one feedback phase of processing.
Next, consider the case of a participant prepared to respond as rapidly as possible to the identity of the second image (i.e., a standard mask identification task). In this case, information regarding the various response alternatives can be sampled more or less continuously until enough evidence has accumulated to warrant committing to a response. There is no requirement that the sensory evidence must result in explicit perceptual awareness before a response can be made; only that there is sufficient sensory evidence to initiate one response rather than the other. Presentation of the prime will activate its associated response, whether conscious awareness of the prime follows or not (Cressman, Franks, Enns, & Chua, 2007; Lleras & Enns, 2006) . If a second image maps to the same response, the evidence required for responding will accumulate to threshold faster than if the second image maps to a different response and the accumulation of evidence for the correct response must start over. The participant in a mask identification task will, of course, try to ignore the information entering the system from the first display, but to the extent that the first image is in the same location, and/or is difficult to discriminate from the second image in time, and/or shares visual features with masks assigned to the response classes, it will be difficult to disentangle the processing arising from the first image and forward response priming will ensue (Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, & Ruys, 2001; Lleras & Enns, 2004; Weidemann, Huber, & Shiffrin, 2005) .
As this brief summary makes clear, according to the reentrant theory of perception, for both kinds of tasks (prime and mask identification) information relevant to responding to either image is being sampled for a period of time that extends beyond the brief presentation of the image. Ordinarily, when perceiving dynamic events in natural settings, such temporal overlap in neural activity from discrete events helps the system to bridge brief gaps in input (Di Lollo, 1980) and to interpret distinct physical events in nearby locations as the same object moving or changing its appearance, a bias we refer to as object-updating (Enns, Lleras, & Moore, in press ). In the artificial setting of the lab, however, where the participant is asked to respond selectively to the components of dynamic sequences, these processes favoring object continuity can lead to confusion. Moreover, this confusion is intensified when the task requires discriminating sensory evidence that arises from the prime versus a mask that is highly similar (as in a prime identification task). In the mask classification task, discriminating the source of the sensory evidence is less important than determining whether there is more of it in support of one response or another. Thus, confusion arises in mask classification when the sources of sensory evidence suggest conflicting responses; by the same token, facilitation results when both sources point to the same response.
According to the reentrant theory, both of these tasks can also be influenced by the intentions of the participant. If the participant is able to form a well-defined expectation of the target or class of target objects that are likely to appear prior to the onset of a display, then the process of hypothesis activation should take less time than if there is less certainty about the images that will be displayed . Thus, for both prime and mask identification, performance should be strongly influenced by the degree to which the participant has been able to form a well-defined task template or filter for the anticipated display prior to its onset. By the same token, task-relevant features should be more likely than task-irrelevant features to influence performance in both tasks, especially if the participant can restrict processing to a narrow range of hypotheses. (Austen & Enns, 2003) .
Similarly, search for a target in a display that is periodically interrupted is not adversely affected by changes in target features that are irrelevant to the target detection response; changes to response-relevant features, on the other hand, slow down search significantly (Lleras, Rensink, & Enns, in press ). Computational models of expectation effects have even been developed to account for the behavior of single cells in the striate cortex (Bridgeman, 1993) .
To summarize, the identification of the first or the second of two images in a rapid sequence are both predicted by reentrant theory to be influenced by factors that bias the perception of a single object in a dynamic sequence and by factors that influence the range of possible perceptual hypotheses in a task.
What is critically different in the requirements of the two tasks is that prime identification cannot occur before a successful match has been established between the feedback sweep of activity generated by an object hypothesis and the currently-available feed-forward sensory evidence (i.e., conscious awareness is a prerequisite for making a response). Mask identification, on the other hand, can occur without the need for a match, that is, it can proceed without the requirement of a feedback sweep of activity to fully confirm a particular hypothesis in the current sensory activity.
OVERVIEW OF STUDY
If similarity effects in either visual masking or masked priming tasks are determined mainly by the goal-directed intentions of the participant, it would be strong evidence against the idea that these phenomena are complete at early levels of representation, that is, at levels encapsulated from the effects of goal-directed perception. In Experiment 1 we tested this idea by presenting pictures of human faces to participants in both a masking and a priming task. These were faces of many different individuals and they varied systematically in the emotions portrayed (either anger or happiness), in the race of the individuals (either Asian or Caucasian), and in their sex (either female or male). However, each participant classified the faces in both tasks using only one of these three dimensions (emotion, race, or sex). The results showed that similarity effects in masking were restricted to taskrelevant features and that masks with similar task-relevant features reduced the visibility of the target face.
The similarity effects in priming were also restricted to task-relevant features, but in this case these similar task-relevant features increased the speed with which the mask could be correctly classified. 
Displays and apparatus
Displays were controlled by an eMac computer and presented centrally on a 17-inch CRT monitor at a viewing distance of approximately 50 cm (screen resolution 1024 x 768 pixels, 256 levels of gray, 89 Hz).
There were a total of 16 different images of individual faces: 2 emotions (angry, happy) x 2 races (Asian, Caucasian) x 2 sexes (female, male) x 2 exemplars (person 1, person 2). Images were selected from the JACFEE set by Matsumoto and Ekman (1988) . Images In the prime classification task the display sequences and instructions were the same except that now the participant was asked to classify the relevant feature of the prime face. Here only accuracy was recorded as the dependent measure and participants were told to guess if they were uncertain about the identity of the prime face.
Results

Speeded task classification
Participants were very accurate overall (mean accuracy exceeded 95% in each group) and mean correct response time (RT) in milliseconds (ms) is shown in Prime classification accuracy 
Relations between tasks
The relations between performance on these two tasks was examined in several ways. First, the correlation between prime visibility (indexed by mean prime classification accuracy) and mask identification (indexed by mask classification RT) was not significant, n = 36, r = -.15, p = .37, suggesting that there was no direct link between prime visibility and the overall speed of mask processing. Yet, there were some factors that seemed to be related to performance in both tasks, including the processing time given exclusively to the prime (prime-mask interval), the extent to which the prime was visible (mean prime classification accuracy) and whether the prime and mask shared task-relevant features (mean difference between mismatching and matching relevant features). In this section we will consider each of these factors in turn.
Increasing prime processing time (the primemask interval) resulted in increases in prime visibil- One possibility worth exploring is that it is not the relationship between prime visibility and mask classification speed that is the important one, but rather the relationship between prime visibility and the net priming effect (RT difference between mismatching and matching trials). Examining this relationship, we find that increasing the processing time always increased the size of the priming effect for task relevant features. Examining possible links between the tasks on the basis of prime visibility also seemed to have mixed effects, i.e., it depended on the factor used to alter prime visibility. On the one hand, increasing prime visibility by increasing the prime-mask interval led to larger priming effects, as already described, but increasing prime visibility by using a mask with mismatching relevant features led to a lengthening rather than to a shortening of the time needed to identify the mask.
So, prime visibility is also not a factor that permits a unified understanding of prime visibility and mask identification speed. With regard to this issue, we note that several recent reports have claimed that primes that are processed exclusively at an unconscious level (i.e., that are effective as primes but invisible to the participant) result in response inhibition in a subsequent identification task involving similar features (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002 . Conversely, primes that are perceived with awareness are thought to result in response activation. Directly relevant to this hypothesis, three conditions in the present experiment yielded prime accuracy levels that did not differ significantly from chance and therefore met a strict criterion for unconscious priming (feature matching conditions for emotion and race in Figure 3 , left column). Yet, all three of these conditions resulted in strong positive priming in the mask identification task. As such, there was no support for prime visibility as a factor that unifies our understanding of these two tasks.
Task-relevant feature similarity was directly related to performance in each of these tasks, but the direction of influence was opposite in the two tasks. Similar relevant features in prime and mask reduced prime visibility (prime accuracy) whereas the same similar features increased the speed with which the mask could be identified. Task-relevant feature similarity is thus a factor that doubly dissociates the task of prime identification from that of mask identification.
Discussion
This study clearly shows a double dissociation between the effects of image similarity on a visual masking task and a masked priming task. This occurred even though the only differences in the two tasks concerned the question posed to participants;
identical image sequences were presented in each .7
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. The second important finding was that task-relevant features (not objective number of shared featues) governed the similarity effects in both tasks. This finding strongly suggests that the representations involved in these two tasks are influenced from the earliest stages by the goals of the participant.
We will have more to say about both of these findings in the General Discussion. However, it is first important to determine whether these results are peculiar to faces as images, or perhaps peculiar to backward masking involving overlapping patterns, or whether these results hold true more generally for other stimuli and other forms of backward masking.
Faces may be treated as a special class of objects by the visual system for a number of reasons, including
(1) their importance as meaningful signals of socialemotional-biological information, (2) the high degree of expertise that participants have acquired about faces over a lifetime of experience, or (3) the relational or configurational aspects of face processing. We also acknowledge that backward pattern masking also often gives rise to fundamentally different results than other forms of masking, such as simultaneous masking and metacontrast masking (Enns, 2004; .
In the next experiment we used a very similar experimental design, but instead of using faces as images, we used geometric shapes and colors as the features that could vary between images in the two displays. Also, instead of using pattern masking (in which the two images overlap one another in space)
we used metacontrast masking, in which the contours of the first image fit snugly against, but do not touch, the contours of the second image.
EXPERIMENT 2: GEOMETRIC SHAPES VARYING IN SHAPE AND COLOR Method
Thirty-six participants from the same pool as There were a total of 4 different images used in first displays: 2 shapes (diamond, square) x 2 colors (blue, red). First display images were 0.9 cm per side (30 pixels). There were also 4 different second display images that were 1.8 cm per (60 pixels) side and contained a star-shaped hole that contained each of the first display images when they were overlaid. The color blue was composed of RGB values 0-0-100 and the red was composed of RGB values of 100-0-0. The background screen was white (RGB 100-100-100).
Trial sequences and procedures were otherwise identical to Experiment 1. In the mask classification task, participants were told that ½ of the shapes would be of each response type (i.e., diamond or square; blue or red) but that they would be presented in random order. 
Results
Speeded task classification
Participants were very accurate in this experiment (mean accuracy exceeded 94% in each group) and mean correct RT is shown in Figure 5 . Prime classification accuracy 
Relations between tasks
The relations between the two tasks were examined in the same way as the previous experiment with 
Mean correct RT in the mask classification task in Experiment 2. Error bar represents one standard error of the mean (SE).
Relevant
Discussion
These results with geometric shapes and colors (rather than faces), using a metacontrast masking procedure (rather than pattern masking), yielded essentially the same results with regard to our two main questions.
First, image similarity reduced first-image visibility (masking task) and increased the speed of second-image classification (priming task). Second, the effect of similarity was significant only for image features that were relevant to the task being undertaken by the participant; equally large variations in the same features had no effect when those features were irrelevant to the goals of the participant.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These experiments are clear in providing evidence for: (1) A double dissociation in the effects of image similarity on a backward masking task and a masked priming task. Similar images were most effective in reducing target visibility in the masking task, as well as being most effective in increasing the speed of responses to visible masks. (2) Task-relevant similarity (not objective similarity) governed the similarity effects in both the masking and the priming task. The same physical features can therefore either influence masking and priming or not, depending on which features are relevant to the classification task the participant is actively engaged in. In this section we will discuss the theoretical implication of these two main findings in turn.
One general point that should be made first, however, is to acknowledge that there were masking effects in these experiments that were independent of the effects of the prime-mask similarity that were the focus of this study. That is, image similarity does not account for all the effects of prime visibility, nor presumably for all of the effects of priming on the task of rapidly classifying the mask image. There are other factors involved, including image contrast and the time between prime and mask. Therefore, bear in mind in the following discussion that we do not deny the importance of these factors. Rather, we will focus on the role that image similarity plays in addition to these other factors.
A second general question that should be addressed concerns whether the accuracy levels reported in the prime classification task of each experiment were contaminated by response bias effects (as opposed to being measures of what participants really experienced). Such a bias could come about, for example, if participants had a tendency to report the prime as "opposite to the visible mask" whenever they were uncertain about the prime's identity (see Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2004 , for a method that is sometimes appropriate for ruling out effects of response bias, but that cannot be applied here because it requires averaging over the matching and mismatching conditions).
We believe there are several reasons why a response bias explanation is insufficient to account for all of the similarity effects in the prime visibility results. First, participants are told that the primes they are trying to classify consist equally of one type versus the other (e.g., equally angry versus happy in the emotion-relevant condition) and so there is no a priori reason we know of to select one bias (i.e., when uncertain, respond "opposite" to visible mask) over another (i.e., when uncertain, respond "same" as visible mask). At the same time, our theoretical perspective of reentrant processing provides plenty of motivation for predicting that perception will be biased by prime-mask similarity in this way. Second, there is a large and longstanding literature documenting that similar masks are more effective than dissimilar masks in reducing the visibility of a prime stimulus, even when response bias is not an issue because the measure of visibility is unrelated to http://www.ac-psych.org the nature of the mask (Breitmeyer, 1984) . Third, to the extent that there is a bias to respond "opposite" when uncertain in the present data, such an effect should reduce in size as the certainty of what is seen is increased (i.e., as the interval between prime and mask is increased). With increased visibility, any guessing strategy would be diminished. Yet the data show that the similarity effects on prime visibility, if anything, increase along with visibility; they are not decreased as predicted by this particular response bias interpretation.
Unique neural systems involved in masking and priming
Ever since Fehrer and Raab's (1962) report that simple RT to the onset of a metacontrast-masked target is unaffected by its visibility, vision researchers have been intrigued by the possibility that some visually guided actions can be accomplished without any accompanying awareness of the target shape that is responsible for the guided action. Since then, dissociations between conscious awareness and visually guided action have been studied in the literatures of visual geometric illusions (Carey, 2001) , metacontrast masking of shape (Klotz & Neumann, 1999) and color (Schmidt, 2002) , and the spatial location of targets in visually guided pointing (Chua & Enns, 2005; Goodale, Pelisson, & Prablanc, 1986) and grasping (Castiello, 1996; Ganel & Goodale, 2003) . However, very little attention has been given to the role played by visual similarity in the two tasks that have been dissociated in these studies.
The present study suggests that any theory of this dissociation must account for both the opposite direction that the influence of image similarity has on masking and priming tasks as well as for the finding that only task-relevant features have an influence on these similarity-based effects.
From the perspective of the theoretical frameworks that are most commonly used to understand the dissociation in masking and priming, there is little reason to suppose that stimulus similarity should influence conscious perception and unconscious response priming in the same way (i.e., that only task relevant features play a role), and there is even less reason to suspect that these effects should be in opposite directions in the two tasks. For instance, within the direct parameter specification (DPS) theory of Neumann (1990) , it is possible for participants to create a direct link between sensory information and the response parameters concerning when and how to respond. Once these are set up, they do not require mediation by conscious processes.
A response is simply activated if the sensory activity contains features relevant to making a given response.
Thus, within the DPS framework, where conscious and unconscious visual processes are considered separately, there is no expectation that the rules of visual similarity would be akin but opposite in their influence when two consciously perceived objects are similar.
Like DPS, the dual visual systems theory of Milner and Goodale (1995) 
Participants' goals influence conscious and unconscious visual processes
The finding that similarity in the task-relevant features & Johnston (1992) , it has been less controversial than when similar points have been raised with respect to displays that are not consciously experienced (Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; McCormick, 1997; Schmidt, 2002) . This is likely because, in the folk psychology of vision researchers, the concept of "unconscious" has been falsely associated with "zombie"-like processes rather than intelligent ones. However, just a moment's reflection will reveal that even the most intelligent of processes relies heavily on a myriad of sub-processes that themselves never result in products of consciousness. Examples include the grammar of spoken language, shape constancy in visual perception, and reaching accurately for the handle of a coffee cup seen for the first time. So it may be time for researchers to abandon the intuitive, but unsupported links in their theories between unconscious and "dumb" (a term often used as shorthand for simple and invariant). This has been the basis of quite a few general models of perception during the past few decades, including the influential feature integration theories of Neisser (1967) and Triesman (1988) , and the two-stage models of rapid serial perception of Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell (1992) and Chun & Potter (1995) . But here too, there is already a growing body of evidence favoring a more interactionist view. For example, earlier we mentioned that participants anticipating change in the identity of a face were faster to detect identity changes than changes in emotional expression, and that participants with the opposite expectation were faster to detect changes in emotion (Austen & Enns, 2003) . A recent report has extended this finding to the detection of two target faces in a rapid serial sequence of faces, with the result that similar targets are more difficult to detect only when their similarity is relevant to the features used to classify the faces (Sy & Giesbrecht, 2006) . Stevanovski, Oriet, and Jolicoeur (2002) also reported a striking example of task relevance governing the influence of conscious perception. The perception of an ambiguous shape was impaired in that study by performing an action specific to one interpretation of the shape. When "<" was described as a left-pointing arrow, it was identified less accurately during a leftward than a rightward response. When the same "<" was described as a right-shining headlight, the opposite pattern of accuracy was observed. How participants intended to encode a shape therefore modulated their perception of it.
Conclusion
Understanding the relationship between conscious and unconscious processing in vision poses a considerable challenge for cognitive scientists. The present findings provide two important clues to this relationship. First, the finding that the conscious processes of object perception indexed in masking studies and the unconscious processes of action control tapped in priming studies are both strongly influenced by the intentions of the participant suggests that the early visual representations that guide both of these systems have much in common. The hypothesis we offer for further testing in this regard is that the reentrant processes we describe as object updating (Enns, Lleras & Moore, in press ) are used to form the early representations that guide both of these systems.
Second, the finding of a double dissociation between masking and priming with regard to the influence of display similarity is consistent with the existence of at least partially unique neural systems underlying these two tasks (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Neumann, 1990) even though these systems may each make use of the same early visual representations. The hypothesis offered here for the double dissociation is that the purpose of conscious perception in a masking task (i.e., to see the first image without interference from the second image) is in direct conflict with the purpose of unconscious visually guided action in a priming task (i.e., to act rapidly on the information in the second image). Specifically, seeing the first image requires an "unbinding" of information that may already have been perceptually grouped when the rapid sequence was first processed. On the other hand, acting on the basis of the second image will be facilitated by earlier processing of related information, especially if that information is "bound" in early visual processing together with the second image. The challenge we set for future studies is therefore to test whether these speculative hypotheses withstand the scrutiny of future experimental data.
